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PREEMPTION OF LOCAL ZONING BY
FEDERAL LESSEE
In Thanet Corp. v. Board of Adjustment 1 the owner of undevel-
oped property in Princeton Township, N. J., entered into an agree-
ment to execute an assignable ground lease with the United States
acting through the Postmaster General. The United States agreed to
use the land for a proposed post office facility,2 even though it was
zoned as an Engineering Research District in which, absent a variance
or special use permit3 a postal use was nonconforming.4 Thanet
was unsuccessful in securing the requisite permit or variance from
the Township Board of Adjustment.5 Nevertheless, the Postmaster
General signed the lease on August 8, 1968.
On its appeal to the Superior Court, Law Division, Thanet argued,
not that the denial of the variances was improper,0 but that the
1. 104 N.J. Super. 180, 249 A.2d 31 (Super. Ct. 1969).
2. The lease agreement called for "the establishment of a post office for a 20.
year term, renewable for a maximum of seven successive five-year terms at the
option of the Post Office." Id. at 181, 249 A.2d at 32. The agreement was by
its terms assignable at the tenant's discretion, possibly to allow for the contingency
of the creation of the U.S. Postal Service to replace the Department. The court,
however, ignored this issue and the potential problems of immunity in the event
an assignment takes place. But see State v. Stonybrook, 149 Conn. 492, 181 A.2d
601 (1962).
3. See generally, Cunningham, Zoning Law in Michigan and New Jersey: A
Comparative Study, 63 Mrcn. L. Rnv. 1171 (1965).
4. Mineola v. Michael Realty Corp. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1965), in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7,
1965 at 19, col. 4.
5. Thanet Corporation, the lessor, was appealing from a denial of a variance
which would have enabled the Post Office to use the land for a postal facility. A
municipal board of adjustment, created under authority of N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:55-36, is a quasi-judicial agency vested with original jurisdiction to "hear and
decide appeals" from the decisions of the building inspector or administrative
agency charged with the enforcement of the zoning ordinances. It is vested with
a quasi-judicial discretion to grant variances consistent with the statutory criteria
of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39. The decision of a board is subject to review in a
"Civil Action at Law in Lieu of Prerogative Writ of Certiorari" in the Superior
Court, Law Division, under Rule 4:88 of the Rules of Civil Practice (1968).
Beirm v. Morris, 14 N.J. 529, 103 A.2d 361 (1954); Izenberg v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 35 N.J. Super. 583, 114 A.2d 732 (Super. Ct. 1955); see Davis, Ad-
ministrative Remedies Often Need Not Be Exhausted, 19 F.R.D. 437, 485-92
(1957).
6. The United States Supreme Court has held that a zoning ordinance is not
unconstitutional if its provisions are reasonable and bear a substantial relation to
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ordinances were not applicable to the lessor of property designated
for use by the United States Government. Accepting this contention,
the court held 7 that the immunity which extends to the United States
when it builds a postal facility8 applies whether the Government owns
or leases the land.
The court employed a presumption that the Post Office Depart-
ment, as a federal agency, is immune from local land use controls in
the absence of an explicit statutory waiver. It was unwilling to apply
local zoning ordinances,9 since doing so would subject the Postmaster
General's administrative decisions concerning the necessity and loca-
tion of postal facilities to local judicial scrutiny. But the court
reached this result by waiting until after the date the lease was exe-
cuted, for prior to execution the court was faced with a request by
a private citizen for immunity in the pre-acquisition or site-designa-
tion stage, where the lessor retained the current possessory estate and
the Postmaster General possessed a mere option to lease. Courts gen-
erally have been reluctant to grant immunity to governmental land
uses when there is less than a current possessory estate.10 This court
was of the same view, as the two-year delay from the filing of the
action until its decision indicates.
Leaving aside the timing of Thanet's application for immunity,
the court's decision to apply immunity to the lessor follows the line
of more recent cases applying immunity to the federal government
as owner of the property immunized." City of Chicago v. Sheridan
& Co.12 summarizes the constitutional aspects of the immunity doc-
trine applied by these cases. In Sheridan, the Illinois Court of Ap-
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. 104 N.J. Super. at 186, 249 A.2d at 34.
8. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
9. 104 N.J. Super. at 183, 249 A.2d at 33.
10. The doctrine of immunity developed in cases where the superior govern-
mental agency had a present proprietary interest in the land zoned. See 31 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 525 (1962).
11. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946); Crivello v. Board of
Adjustment, 183 F. Supp. 826 (D.N.J. 1960); Tim v. City of Long Branch, 135
N.J.L. 549, 53 A.2d 164 (E. & A. 1947); Mineola v. Michael Realty Corp. (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. 1965), in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1965 at 19, col. 4. Contra, Carroll v. Board
of Adjustment, 15 N.J. Super. 363, 83 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1951); City of
Chicago v. Sheridan & Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 57, 151 N.E.2d 451 (1958); City of
Baltimore v. Linthicum Corp., 170 Md. 245, 183 A. 531 (Ct. App. 1936).
12. 18 Ill. App. 2d 57, 151 N.E.2d 451 (1958).
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peals stated the basic principle of intergovernmental preemption when
it commented that the issue:
... consistently [turns] on the question, in each particular case,
whether or not the federal government can achieve its objective
within the framework of the local law. If it can, it becomes sub-ject to such laws; if it cannot, such laws must yield to the superior
interest of the federal government.1 3
The Thanet court seems to accept this notion of immunity based
on preemption, but it was faced with the problem of transmittingimmunity from tenant to lessor. It is a basic rule of landlord and
tenant law that leases for illegal or prohibited purposes are unen-
forceable when the premises were let with the knowledge and intent
of both parties that they were to be used for an illegal purpose.1'
Moreover, such leases are voidable by the governmental entity they
offend1 5 Thus the court could have found on the facts that the lease
violated Princeton Township's zoning ordinances, and could have
declared it void.26 The court chose instead to rely on Tim v. City of
Long Branchy7 a zoning case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the United States Government's right, under the Lanham
Public War Housing Act, 8 to convert a residence that it leased into
an apartment building in violation of the local zoning ordinances.
The Tim court specifically found that the Lanham Act superseded
13. Id. at 59, 151 N.E.2d at 455; see also James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,
302 U.S. 134 (1937); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1942); United
States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1944); Town of Bloomfield v.
New Jersey Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658 (1955); Note,
Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STArN.
L. Rnv. 208 (1959).
14. 1 AmERicAN LAw op PR6dERTY § 3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
15. Hartsin Const. Corp. v. Millhauser, 136 Misc. 646, 241 N.Y.S. 428 (App.
Div. 1930); Ober v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Misc. 869, 284 N.Y.S. 966
(N.Y. City Ct. 1935); Annot., 128 A.L.R. 87 (1940).
16. City of Baltimore v. Linthicum Corp., 170 Md. 245, 183 A. 531 (Ct. App.
1936).
17. 135 N.J.L. 549, 53 A.2d 164 (E. & A. 1947).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1521 et seq. (1942). The Tim court commented that "[the
policy and purposes of the [Lanham Act] are, for the duration of the emergency
as declared by the President of the United States, to further the national defense
by providing 'housing for persons engaged in national-defense activities, and their
families ... in those areas or localities in which the President shall find that an
acute shortage of housing exists or impends which would impede national-defense
activities and that such housing would not be provided by private capital when
needed.'" Tim v. City of Long Branch, 135 N.J.L. 549, 551, 53 A.2d 164, 166
(E. & A. 1947).
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the local zoning law and held the lessor immune because the federal
government was the tenant.19
But a later New Jersey case indicates that the mere fact that the
lessee is a government does not necessarily assure immunity for the
lessor. In Carroll v. Board of Adjustment,20 the lessor of property
designated for use by the state as an Employment Security Office was
held not to be immune from contrary local zoning. The rationale
was that the tenant takes his interest solely from that which the lessor
can convey; only the owner can confer immunity, and to do so it
must be a governmental agency.' Carroll thus denies to the state the
preemption allowed the federal government in Tim. By implication,
only when the tenant is the federal government is the lessor assured
of immunity.
In distinguishing Tim by the presence of specific federal legislation
empowering the United States to lease necessary property without
regard to municipal ordinance, 22 Carroll sows the seeds of its own
distinction by indicating that no claim was made there that similar
overriding legislation was applicable. Without citing Carroll, the
Thanet court notes that the Postmaster General is empowered by
statute to enter into leases to secure postal facilities.2 3 However, these
statutes seem to be cited not so much to demonstrate the kind of pre-
emption found in Tim, but to show the absence of a waiver of im-
munity.
Federal statute empowers the Postmaster General to acquire prop-
erty by eminent domain as well as by purchase or by lease. 24 Had
the Postmaster General chosen to condemn Thanet's land, it is clear
that the Princeton Township Board of Adjustment could not have re-
19. Tim v. City of Long Branch, 135 N.J.L. 549, 554, 53 A.2d 164, 167 (E. &
A 1947).
20. 15 N.J. Super. 363, 83 A.2d 448 (App. Div. 1951).
21. The fact that the building was to be used for governmental purposes was
immaterial. The corporation was in fact the owner, and could rynt be considered
a governmental agency. 15 N.J. Super. at 368, 83 A.2d at 450.
22. Id.
23. "IT]he Postmaster General ... may: ... acquire by purchase, condemna-
tion, [or) lease, . . . real property and interests therein, for use for postal pur-
poses ... ." 39 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1970).
24. Authority for taking by eminent domain is contained in 39 U.S.C. §§
2103(a)(2)(A), 2113(a), and 2115, supplementing the authority granted by
40 U.S.C. § 257: "In every case in which ... any ... officer of the Government
has been authorized to procure real estate for the erection of a public building
or for other public use, he may acquire the same for the United States by con-
detonation . .. ."
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viewed that decision to take,25 nor could it have impeded the taking.20
Furthermore, it has been held7 that where property is taken by pur-
chase, but could have been taken by eminent domain, the use of the
land for governmental purposes is not subject to zoning restrictions. 28
It seems reasonable to apply the same theory where the interest could
be acquired by lease.29
In appealing the denial of the variances, Thanet sought a form of
relief amounting to mandamus. But the Board of Adjustment is
unable to enforce the zoning ordinances by enjoining Thanet. This
result obtains since, in a proceeding for an injunction against the use
of leased premises, the tenant, as a real party in interest, is entitled
to be represented3 0 In Mineola v. Michael Realty Corp.,32 where the
United States was the tenant, this procedural argument was coupled
with the doctrine of sovereign immunity to deny the competency of
a state court's jurisdiction. The Mineola court held that an injunc-
tion:
... will not lie against the owner of an improved parcel which
has been leased to the United States Government as a Post Office,
to restrain an aspect of its use. Such action, while only against
the owner nominally, is in actuality against the operator, i.e., the
United States.3 2
25. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v.
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); United
States v. An Easement and Right-of-Way, 246 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Sixteen Parcels, 281 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Mischke, 285 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1961); United States v. Certain
Property in Manhattan, 32 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rassi v. Trunkline Gas
Co.,--Ind.-, 240 N.E.2d 49 (1968); 1 NicHOLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 411(3) (Supp. 1969).
27. United States v. An Easetnent and Right-of-Way, 246 F. Supp. 263 (W.D.
Ky. 1965).
28. Union Bldg. & Const. Corp. v. Borough of Totowa, 98 N.J. Super. 446,
237 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. 1968).
29. Other areas of the law have accepted similar contentions that possession
of a leasehold is for those purposes the equivalent of a fee. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031(a)-I(c) (1956),'whch provides that an exchange of a fee for a 30-
year or more leasehold interest qualifies as a like kind exchange. See also Camara
v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967), validating consent to building code
searches where consent is given by the occupant of the building although only the
owner is subject to code penalties.
30. 4 NICHrOLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1241(1) (Supp. 1969).
31. Mineola v. Michael Realty Corp. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1965), in N.Y.L.J., Dec.
7, 1965 at 19, col. 4; 1 RATHKOPFT, LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING 31-26 (Supp.
1969).
32. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1965 at 19, col. 6.
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Thus a suit in a state court against the United States as the unnamed
real party in interest is not maintainable."a
Removal to a federal court may provide a forum for the contro-
versy but little actual relief. If the federal court views the problem
in terms of the federal power of eminent domain, the local zoning
will be preempted 34 unless the proposed action would be contrary to
an express congressional policy.35 The fate of local zoning in the face
of federal land acquisitions by purchase, lease or condemnation would
seem therefore to depend on an expression of congressional intent
to limit the application of federal preemption. Such an expression is
found, at least with regard to urban lands, in the Intergovernmental
Cooperation Act of 1968.36 Title V of the Act provides that urban
land transactions of the federal government "shall, to the greatest
extent practicable, be consistent with zoning and land use practices
and shall be made to the greatest extent practicable in accordance
with planning and development objectives of the local governments
and local planning agencies concerned." 37
Title V is not the whole answer to the Thanet problem. The Act
is limited to urban areas,38 and the determination of "practicability"
is to be made by the federal administrator. Final resolution, however,
will of necessity await judicial re-evaluation of the preemption case
law in light of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act.
Barry Allan Brown
33. See Crivello v. Board of Adjustment, 183 F. Supp. 826 (D.N.J. 1960),
where such a case was removed to the federal courts. See also Byse, Sovereign
Immunity, 75 HAiv. L. Rav. 1479 (1962); Davis, Suing the Government by
Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. Cni. L. Rv. 435 (1962).
34. United States v. Sixteen Parcels, 281 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1960); Maun v.
United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965); City of Pleasant Ridge v. Romney,
382 Mich. 225, 169 N.W.2d 625 (1969).
35. Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965), holding that the
policy behind preservation of the ecological integrity of the California Redwood
area was in accord with the goals of established federal policy evidenced by 42
U.S.C. § 1500 (Supp. V 1970) and 23 U.S.C. § 131 (Supp. V 1970).
36. Act of Oct. 16, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-577, 82 Stat. 1103. This Act was
codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq. (Supp. V 1970) and 40 U.S.C. §§ 531
et seq. (Supp. V 1970).
37. Act of Oct. 16, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-577, § 501, 82 Stat. 1104.
38. 40 U.S.C. § 535(b) (Supp. V 1970) defines an "urban area" as:
. ..any geographical area within the jurisdiction of any incorporated city,
town, borough, village, or other unit of general local government, except
county or parish, having a population of ten thousand or more inhabitants
:.. [or portions of counties having] a population density equal to or exceed-
ing one thousand five hundred inhabitants per square mile and situated
adjacent to the boundary of any incorporated unit of general local govern-
ment which has a population of ten thousand.
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